Author Archive Sasha Soriano

Book review : « The Third Way » by A. Giddens


The sociologist Anthony Giddens is one of the most famous "Third Way" theorists. In 1994, he published a book of political theory entitled Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, which met with phenomenal success.

The British Labour Party, which had been in opposition for 20 years, decided to use Giddens' writings to reinvent its social-democratic doctrine and propose a new political offer in a world that had become unipolar following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Anthony Giddens thus became one of Tony Blair's most influential political advisors. His political essay entitled The Third Way published in 1998, is an attempt to popularise the ideas of the "Third Way" in the United Kingdom.

The ideas developed by Anthony Giddens on the concept of the "Third Way" did not only serve as a doctrinal basis for the British Labour Party. They have also been widely discussed and debated within the whole Social Democratic family and utilized to reinvent itself in many countries such as the United States, Sweden and Germany.

Anthony Giddens places the "Third Way" in the centre-left of the political chessboard.

"La substance du débat consiste à savoir comment les valeurs du centre gauche peuvent être amendées, puis appliquées à un monde globalisé."1

For him, globalization should not be understood at economic level only, with the financial markets. It is a complete transformation in people’s lives, taking into account changes in family, culture, government structures, communication systems that create “new transnational systems and forces”, a level infinitely higher than the nation-state.2

He is aware that the left has to reinvent itself if it wants to win the elections in the United Kingdom again. It is a question of giving the left a new guiding thought. Hence the subtitle of the book: "The Renewal of Social Democracy".

It involves a radical break with the classic social democratic model. The role of the state must be reinvented at the economic and social levels to take account of the globalization of the world, which implies going beyond the framework of the nation.

Comparison with the social democratic model of the 1950/60s

1. The role of the state in the economy

The social-democratic model of the "Glorious Thirty" was based on an interventionist state, i.e. a state that was an important economic actor and that regulated capitalism within its territory. The economic policies carried out there had to ensure economic growth (of collective wealth) and full employment.

Giddens considers that the interventionist role of the state is outdated as a result of the globalization of economic exchanges and that the economy must now be regulated at a supranational level. In

his view, the globalization of the economy must be seen as “positive” that “can be an engine of economic development” and integrated into the thinking software of the left.3

2. The role of the state in society

The social-democratic model of the "Glorious Thirty" is based on an important social state. Redistribution policies must ensure a more egalitarian society and the protection of individuals throughout their lives. The Thirdwayers reject the Welfare State:

2.1. "Real" equality of opportunity vs. egalitarian society

The Thirdwayers are abandoning the universal belief in social justice. Indeed, this vision could lead to a conflict between equality and individual freedom.4 They prefer to talk about real equality of opportunity. Equality must be defined as “inclusion” by opposition of inequality as “exclusion”.5 The state should not support individuals throughout their lives but ensure that inequalities are corrected at the root to ensure real equality of opportunity. This requires aid for the most disadvantaged and major state investment, particularly in education and health.

In the United Kingdom, for example, New Labour has tried to reconcile a market economy of "free and undistorted competition" with significant public subsidies in the fields of health, education and transport or with the creation of a national minimum wage, advocating a more social European Union and increasing the number and amount of social benefits (e.g. the winter fuel oil bonus).6

2.2. New individualism vs. class society: valuing the individual and individual success (e.g. Bill Gates)

The Thirdwayers give an important role to the individual. Individualism should no longer be seen as a conservative value as opposed to the collectivism advocated by communists and socialists.7

"C’est la croyance en une individualisation du social qui se trouve ici consacrée. En atteste, en parallèle, l’imposant travail de conceptualisation d’un nouvel individualisme."8

The objective is not to equalise living conditions between groups or social classes, but to offer an autonomy of action allowing each person to fulfil himself, implying a more active way of living his life.9 "One might suggest as a prime motto for the new politics, no rights without responsibilities."10

2.3. A reduced and active rather than an expanded but passive Welfare State

They reject the Welfare State, i.e. interventionism and redistributive policies, and prefer the efficiency of the State, a smaller but active and positive Welfare State, tougher fight against crime, etc., rather than a larger but passive Welfare State, synonym of "bureaucracy"11.

"Il faut accepter l'idée d'un marché du travail dynamique parce que flexible. Ce qui signifie, pour un certain nombre de pays européens, moins de régulations. Dérégulation ne signifiant pas forcément, dans mon esprit, diminution de la protection sociale. La dérégulation du travail favorise en général la création de nouveaux emplois."12

The State should not be a "safety net" that protects individuals throughout their lives. It must be transformed into "un État tremplin"13 that does not intervene directly - or little - in the economy, but which encourages innovation and economic activity, thus promoting employment, while guaranteeing equal opportunities for all and protecting the weakest.

The government should be reformed following the ecological principle of "getting more from less"14, learning from business best practice.

3. The centrality of ecology

The economic growth model of the 1950/60s was based on the production of goods and heavy industry, which left little room for ecology. For the Thirdwayers, on the contrary, it is essential to place ecology at the heart of the new social democratic project: "ecological modernization is beneficial for business"15. Environmental hazards must be treated as an opportunity for innovation, and this must be done at a supranational level, across the borders of nations, in a world that is interconnected in practice.


The role that the Thirdwayers give to the State is therefore completely different from the social democratic model of the "Glorious Thirty".

The "Third Way" was an attempt to reinvent social democracy in the 1990s. Anthony Giddens placed it halfway – or more exactly beyond - between the social democratic model of the 50/60s and the neo-liberalism of the 70/80s.

La troisième voie n'est qu'une étiquette qui signifie un renouvellement de la social-démocratie. Je l'avais mise en sous-titre d'un de mes livres. Mais je n'en suis pas dépositaire, chacun peut l'utiliser comme il veut. Il s'agit de repenser la social-démocratie en Europe et ailleurs à la lumière des changements massifs qui ont affecté la planète: mondialisation, déclin du keynésianisme et du socialisme, entrée dans l'âge de l'information? On ne peut plus continuer à réfléchir dans les mêmes termes qu'hier comme si de rien n'était. Les deux autres voies - d'un côté, la gauche social-démocrate traditionnelle axée sur le conflit des classes et de l'autre, le néolibéralisme et sa croyance fondamentaliste dans le marché - ont perdu de leur pertinence.16

The doctrine of the "Third Way" has been strongly criticized, especially on the left, which has seen it as nothing more than disguised neo-liberals - a reshaped version of capitalism with a human face17 - and a betrayal of the values of the workers' movement from which it originates. The right also questions the "Third Way", seen either as a marketing mirage (responding to a decline in traditional class loyalties) or “a Trojan horse for socialists whose ideology threatens free society”18.

The Third Way doctrine theorized by Giddens, however, met with electoral success in the 1990s, symbolized by the elections of Tony Blair (United Kingdom), Bill Clinton (United States) and Gerhard Schroeder (Germany), guided by a pragmatic view in the face of new global challenges (globalization, ecology, changing nature of family, work, personal and cultural identity).


Basham P. (2000), "The Third Way: Marketing Mirage or Trojan Horse?", Public Policy Sources, The Fraser Institute, 2000(33), 38 p.

Bell S. (2011), "Quel avenir pour la social-démocratie en Europe ?", Fondapol (Fondation pour l’innovation politique), December 2011, 44 p.

Boileau J, (2002), "Anthony Giddens au Devoir - Le penseur de la troisième voie", Le Monde, 2 June 2002.

Giddens A. (1998), The Third Way, London, Polity Press, 1st edition? 166 p.

Giddens A. interviewed by Enderlin S. (1999), "La troisième voie n’est pas une potion magique", Le Temps, 7 January 1999.

Giddens A. interviewed (2001), "La troisième voie ne signifie pas abandonner les valeurs de la gauche", L'Economiste-Libération, 8 June 2001.

Jobert B. (2003), "La troisième voie : un impératif de civilisation ?", Lectures critiques in Revue française de science politique, 2003/2 (Vol. 53), pp. 305-312.

Tournadre-Plancq J. (2010), "La Troisième voie et la question sociale", Informations sociales, 2010/3(159), pp. 24-33.

Machiavel expliqué par la « guerre des masques »

03/04/2020 Commentaires fermés sur Machiavel expliqué par la « guerre des masques » By Sasha Soriano

Dans un contexte de crise internationale liée au coronavirus, un événement rocambolesque vient de faire la une de la presse : de nombreux pays, dont la France, qui avaient passé des commandes de masques en Chine ont eu la désagréable surprise de voir des commanditaires du gouvernement américain débarquer sur le tarmac des aéroports chinois avec des valises de dollars pour repartir ensuite avec la cargaison tant convoitée. Cette « guerre des masques » entre pays provoque bien entendu un tollé de réactions indignées : certains parlent d’un acte totalement immoral de la part des Américains tandis que d’autres y voient carrément un acte de piraterie. Lorsque certains médias relatent la même histoire mais cette fois avec une opération qui aurait été montée par le Mossad, les redoutables et redoutés services secrets israéliens, les réseaux sociaux déjà brûlants sur la question, s’enflamment littéralement.

Le focus médiatique porté sur cette « guerre des masques » entre pays nous permet pourtant de revenir à la base de la science politique et à la théorie politique développée par Machiavel. Ce penseur italien du XVIème siècle est généralement considéré comme le fondateur de la pensée politique moderne, en tant que celle-ci est une pensée de l’Etat.

La « vérité effective des choses »

Machiavel est un penseur que l’on peut qualifier de réaliste. Il se propose de penser la politique non pas pour ce qu’elle devrait être mais sur ce qu’elle est dans sa réalité la plus crue (« la vérité effective de la chose»), à savoir celle des rapports de force où se déploie la politique comme stratégie du pouvoir. Ses conseils prodigués au Prince pour conquérir et conserver le pouvoir sont véritablement … machiavéliques ! Il n’hésite pas à conseiller au Prince de violer sa propre moralité et ne pas tenir sa parole si cela lui est utile.

Rupture avec la philosophie des Anciens

En recommandant au Prince de faire le mal si c’est dans son propre intérêt, Machiavel établit une rupture totale avec la philosophie des Anciens (notamment Aristote). Il est ainsi le cas stupéfiant – et en son temps, scandaleux – d’un effort radical pour penser la politique hors des cadres traditionnels du droit naturel classique (le jusnaturalisme aristotélicien et thomiste). L’Etat est désormais pensé non plus à partir de sa fin idéale (le bonheur, la vertu), mais à partir des situations d’urgence ou de crise, où la nécessité impose sa loi et où des actions immorales, comme le mensonge ou la duperie, peuvent être la condition du salut public. De là le postulat fondamental de la politique : tenir les hommes pour mauvais.

Un acte immoral ?

Certains ont pu interpréter le Prince comme une œuvre d’une immoralité proprement choquante. Le cynisme du gouvernement américain dans la « guerre des masques » entre pays peut de prime abord également être perçu comme un acte immoral. Tout comme la décision du gouvernement français de ne pas envoyer de matériel médical en Italie ou de celle de l’exécutif néerlandais de refuser des malades espagnols sur son territoire.

La pensée de Machiavel est cependant beaucoup plus riche que cela. Il faut relire son « Discours sur la première Décade de Tite-Live » où il fait l’éloge de la vertu et de la liberté républicaine et l’interprétation qui en a été donnée par des auteurs comme Baruch Spinoza ou Jean-Jacques Rousseau ou encore des contemporains comme Louis Althusser ou Claude Lefort pour s’en convaincre. La théorie politique de Machiavel est en fait liée à un contexte politique particulier (à la « conjoncture » pour reprendre les mots employés par Althusser), celui de la formation d’un Etat national italien unifié capable de résister aux invasions étrangères d’une part et au pouvoir politique de la papauté d’autre part. C’est le Machiavel révolutionnaire : la violence est nécessaire pour la fondation de l’Etat unifié. Mais Machiavel est aussi celui qui pense le Prince à partir du peuple. Machiavel est un amoureux de la liberté qu’il ne pense possible que par l’alliance entre le Prince et le peuple contre l’influence des grands. C’est le Machiavel républicain.

Le cynisme n’est donc pas le dernier mot de Machiavel. Dire que « la fin justifie les moyens » n’implique pas que n’importe quel moyen est bon à n’importe quelle fin, mais signifie que les fins politiques légitimes requièrent des moyens adéquats qui, en situation de crise ou de violence, ne peuvent pas éviter d’être violents. Ces moyens ne sont justifiés que pour autant qu’ils sont strictement nécessaires à produire une fin qui n’est pas mauvaise mais bonne.

Le Prince machiavélien n’est donc pas le tyran qui se laisse aller à ses passions, il est au contraire celui qui utilise les moyens nécessaires à la force de son Etat, et qui est donc capable de vertu (en situation normale) et de violence (en situation d’exception). Le Prince n’obéit pas à son intérêt personnel : il doit être capable du bien comme du mal selon, les exigences du salut de l’Etat.

Nouvelle interprétation  de la "guerre des masques"

C’est à la lumière de cette interprétation des œuvres de Machiavel que l’on se doit de réinterpréter la « guerre des masques » que se livrent les pays, même amis, en pleine crise sanitaire. Donald Trump doit assurer la sécurité sanitaire de sa population. Il est comptable de ses actions devant son propre peuple et c’est à lui seul qu’il doit rendre des comptes. Selon la théorie de Machiavel, le gouvernement américain peut utiliser tous les moyens jugés utiles, y compris des actes moralement répréhensibles, dès lors qu’ils sont strictement nécessaires à produire une fin qui est bonne (la sécurité sanitaire des Américains). C’est pour le bien de l’Etat que le Prince doit être prêt à faire le mal, quitte à prendre sur lui le poids du pêché et à risquer ainsi le salut de son âme.

La presse (qui « fait » l’opinion) a donc bien tort lorsqu’elle place la « guerre des masques » sur le seul critère de la morale. La question n’est pas de savoir si l’acte du gouvernement américain ou israélien est bien ou mal. La moralité politique constitue un type spécifique de moralité qui s’écarte de la moralité individuelle ou privée en ceci qu’elle doit être capable de tirer le bien du mal et de faire le mal en vue du bien. Les vertus morales ne sont pas des vertus politiques. La violence politique n’est justifiée que par les circonstances qui l’imposent. Tel est le véritable enseignement de Machiavel. Tel est également l’enseignement que l’on devrait tirer de cette « guerre des masques ».

Book Review: How democracies die, by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, 2018


Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt are both professors of government at Harvard University. One studies Latin America and the developing world, the other focuses on Europe from the nineteenth century to the present. The association of both specialties applied to political situation in America gives “How Democracies die”.

They demonstrate how a democracy can be destroyed from inside by elected autocrats.


Democracy in danger

According to the Authors, an autocrat can take power by violence with, for example, a military coup d’état or a putsch. But he can also take power in a rather discrete way by fooling the population on his true aspirations. Indeed, a potential dictator is generally charismatic and appears as a saviour of the nation, especially in a time of crisis. Political parties may join forces with him to win electorates without seeing the danger he represents. Once in power, he uses democratic laws to internally destroy democracy and its institutions and thus remain in power.

It should be possible recognize an autocrat through a “democratic test”, inspired by Linz:

  1. Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game
  2. Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents
  3. Tolerance or encouragement of violence
  4. Readiness to curtail civil liberty of opponents, including media

Gatekeeping in America

In the USA, there were traditionally gatekeepers of democracy who protected democracy by choosing the candidates for elections.: political parties. The candidates were chosen in “smoke-filled” room by power brokers. This selection was not a very democratic procedure, but it has the role of “choosing a popular candidate and keeping out demagogues”. Gatekeeping institutions go back to the founding of the American republic.

In 1968, the system evolved so that the people choose these candidates. Today, gatekeepers highlight favourites while trying to dismiss demagogues, but they are less effective than in the past. Since this reform, the number of outsiders has increased significantly. Thanks to new media, the population is less polarized and sometimes vote for extremist positions. Elections are normalized and people vote for their favourite party.

This is a potential danger to democracy. The paradox is that to guarantee it, we need a slightly less democratic system.

The great republican abdication

It is in this context that the candidate Trump emerged. He managed to get through all the roadblocks placed by the gatekeepers thanks to funding for the invisible primary, then the primary and finally the elections.

Applying the test inspired by Linz to all presidents for 100 years, we can observe that he is the only one to fulfil all the criteria:

  1. In case of defeat he would not have accepted the result of the elections, he clearly stated that the elections would be rigged and completely questioned the American democratic system. He thus completes the first criterion which is the refusal of the rules of the democratic game;
  2. He described his opponents as criminals by saying that Obama was not American and advocating that Clinton should be jailed. He therefore denies the legitimacy of his opponents and adheres to the second criterion;
  3. He refused to condemn the violence of his supporters and is himself very verbally abusive and confirms the third criterion, tolerance or encouragement of violence;
  4. And finally, he asked a prosecutor to investigate Clinton and represses the media who criticize him by threatening them and banning them from the White House. So, we have the hindrances to the civil liberties of its opponents and the media.

Trump has all the characteristics of authoritarian behavior and the problem is that the Republican Party supports it thoroughly.

This was not the case for all countries facing the rise of populist candidates. In Belgium in the 1930’s, political parties faced an increase in votes for the Nationalist party (the Rex Party and the Vlaams National Verbond). The three historic parties (Catholic Party, the Socialists and the Liberal Party) decided to form a coalition against their own interests in order to protect democracy from the fascist threat.

Subverting democracy

In general, the end of democracy happens insidiously, measure by measure, reform by reform

to silence the opponents. Take for example the end of the 19th century in the USA; the Democrats saw their score drop drastically when the African American population were given the vote. Indeed, this new population, having freshly received the right to vote, put it in favour the Republicans. The Democrats then passed a law requiring voters to do a language test to limit access to the polls of the African American population, who were still poorly literate because they had recently been released from slavery. Through this reform, the Democrats regained majority.

We can see how, to serve one's own interests, a party can amputate or manipulate democracy.

For democracy to work, the people must have great confidence in the constitution, and in democratic institutions and organizations. What is also fundamental is that leaders respect the "unwritten rules" because the constitution does not work by itself. As James Bryce said: “It is not the American constitution that made the American political system work, but rather what he called "usages".”

All participants must adhere to some basic principles as “mutual tolerance and forbearance”.

These norms are the sine qua non condition for the democracy to exist and they lately, have been overridden.

Critical Review

About the subject covered by the book "How democracies die"

“ … there is another way to break a democracy. It is less dramatic but equally destructive. Democracies may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders - president or prime ministers - who subvert the very process that brought them to power. Some of these leaders dismantle democracy quickly, as Hitler did in the wake of the 1933 Reichstag fire in Germany. More often, though, democracies erode slowly, in barely visible steps.” (p.3)

The main question the authors attempt to answer, how democracies die, is not new. It was already asked by the Greek philosophers. Nothing interested Aristotle (Politics) more than two questions: How is a democratic system maintained? How does a democratic regime change or is it overthrown to make way for tyranny? Alexis de Tocqueville, who had studied United States politics, also asked the same question: Western societies inevitably move towards equality; therefore, the question that arises is whether an egalitarian society will be liberal or tyrannical.

Main characteristics of a demagogue

“… demagogue’s initial rise to power tends to polarize society, creating a climate of panic hostility, and mutual distrust.” (p.76)

Many pages of the book are devoted to describing the known populist as Donald Trump but also Mussolini, Hitler, Chavez and many other autocrats. There appear to them several points in common: the fact of being in a balance of power and not in the debate, their clear designation of the enemy of the nation that must be eradicated and which echoes the nationalist electorate, the period of their rise to power is always made during a major crisis in the country with a speech full of promise flattering the people.

“President Trump exhibited clear authoritarian instinct during his first year in office. … Three strategies by which elected authoritarians seek to consolidate power: capturing the referees, sidelining the key players and rewriting the rules to tilt the playing field against opponents. Trump attempted all three of these strategies.” (p.177)

The book gives in fact many examples of the characteristics of a demagogue or a tyrant in the sense this notion was defined by the Greek philosophers.

Machiavel (The Prince) already provided the governors of each regime with advice on the best way to preserve the existing regime. If a tyrannical regime is bad, the means necessary to maintain it will also be bad: they will be detestable, contrary to morality. In this line, W. Pareto introduced a simple classification of political regimes according to the psycho-social character of the governing people: the ones are lions (preferably using the force), the others are foxes (using cunning, speech and speculation).

The 4 cumulative criteria to decode an autocrat

The authors developed a litmus test to help identify would-be autocrats before they come to power. The book states four negative criteria to detect an autocrat: challenging the legitimacy of the winner; delegitimizing his opponents, encouraging violence and questioning political freedoms. These criteria are in fact the mirror of the criteria set out by Raymond Aron (Democracy and Totalitarianism) that form the basis of a democracy. For this liberal thinker, democracy is based on peaceful electoral competition for the exercise of power. This definition presupposes the existence of two or more political parties (“gatekeepers” in the sense given by the Authors) and therefore the following four positive criteria: the loser must not contest the result of the elections (accepting the democratic rules of the game), the loser must be able to express his opposition and compete in the next election (legitimacy of the opponent), each opponent must respect the rules of the game (competition must be peaceful and not be resolved by violence) and citizens must be able to express their opinion without risking going to prison (political freedom).

Unwritten rules

“Democracy, of course, is not street basketball. Democracies do have written rules (constitution) and referees (the courts). But these work best, and survive longest, in countries where written constitution is reinforced by their own unwritten rules of the game. This rules or norms serve as the soft guardrails of democracy, preventing day-to-day political competition from devolving into a no-holds-barred conflict”. (p.101)

The book refers to two unwritten rules: mutual toleration and forbearance.

This is what Montesquieu (Esprit des Lois) - pointed p.213 - refers to when he speaks of the "distribution of powers". Power must stop power in order to avoid absolutism. The result is a set of written and unwritten rules where, as on a chess game, each power has a specific place on the political chessboard and advances its pieces according to precise rules. The example of the battle between the executive power and the English Parliament on Brexit is the most current example.


The authors can be classified as "liberal" political scientists since they use many concepts of this school of thought (Baron de Montesquieu, Alexis de Tocqueville, Raymond Aron, etc.), even if these authors are rarely or never mentioned.

They oppose Marxist political scientists who through analysis of economics and conflict between social classes attempt to explain the end of democracy. Marx believed that capitalist societies were affected by fundamental contradictions and that, consequently, they would undoubtedly go towards a revolutionary explosion. The subject is completely absent in the book.

This is a fairly classic book of liberal thinkers. But it is interesting because it applies their concepts to current topics.



  • Raymond Aron, Démocratie et totalitarisme. (Gallimard,1965).
  • Raymond Aron, Les étapes de la pensée sociologique. Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, Tocqueville, Durkheim, Pareto, Weber. (Gallimard, 1967).
  • Alexis de Tocqueville, La démocratie en Amérique. (L'Harmattan, 2005).
  • Nicolas Machiavel, Le Prince. (Broché, 2007).
  • Aristote, La politique. (Broché, 1995).


  • Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die Teacher’s Guide. (The Penguin Random House, n.a.). Accessed 20 Oct. 2019
  • David Runciman, How Democracies Die review – Trump and the shredding of norms. (The Guardian, 24 Jan. 2018). Accessed 13 Oct. 2019
  • Mathilde Damgé, En carte : la progression des extrêmes droites en Europe. (Le Monde, 11 Sep. 2018). Accessed 13 Oct. 2019
  • Julien Licourt, Que pèse réellement l’extrême droite en Europe ? (Le Figaro, 1 Dec. 2016). Accessed 13 Oct. 2019
  • Alexis Feertchak, Tour du monde des pays touchés par la vague du populisme. (Le Figaro International, 27 Oct. 2018). Accessed 13 Oct. 2019


  • Review: How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. (CaspianReport, 29 Mar. 2019). Accessed 20 Oct. 2019
  • Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die. (The Brainwaves Video Anthology, 12 Apr. 2018). Accessed 20 Oct. 2019